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On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in Aggregative Charging Games
Dario Paccagnan, Francesca Parise and John Lygeros
Abstract—Several works have recently suggested to model the
problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric
vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to
coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such game.
However, Nash equilibria have been shown to posses desirable
system-level properties only in simplified cases. In this work, we
use the concept of price of anarchy to analyze the inefficiency of
Nash equilibria when compared to the social optimum solution.
More precisely, we show that i) for linear price functions depend-
ing on all the charging instants, the price of anarchy converges to
one as the population of vehicles grows; ii) for price functions that
depend only on the instantaneous demand, the price of anarchy
converges to one if the price function takes the form of a positive
pure monomial; iii) for general classes of price functions, the
asymptotic price of anarchy can be bounded. For finite popula-
tions, we additionaly provide a bound on the price of anarchy
as a function of the number vehicles in the system. We support
the theoretical findings by means of numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade we have witnessed a profound change
in the way energy systems are operated. A new paradigm
called demand response is emerging, according to which the
energy requirements of a population of users are tuned, by
means of incentives, to account for the operational needs of
the power grid [1]. Previous works [2], [3] have suggested to
model these demand response methods as a game. Therein
each player represents a user that needs to optimize his
energy consumption over a given period of time, with the
objective of minimizing his electricity bill. What couples the
users, and thus makes the charging problem a game, is the
assumption that the energy price depends at every instant
of time on the sum of the energy demand of the whole
population. The seminal paper [2] shows that the (unique)
Nash equilibrium of such game has desirable properties from
the standpoint of the grid operator, in the case of large
and homogeneous populations. Under these assumptions, [2]
shows that the equilibrium is socially optimum in the sense
that it minimizes the collective electricity bill (including the
cost of both flexible and inflexible demand) and fills the
overnight demand valley. As a result, a rich body of literature
has focused on devising distributed and decentralized schemes
that are numerically efficient, and can be used by the grid
operator to coordinate the strategies of the agents to a Nash
equilibrium [2]–[7]. Less attention has been devoted to verify
whether the optimality statement made in [2] is still valid in the
presence of more general cost functions, agents heterogeneity
and realistic charging constraints (e.g., upper bounds on the
This work was supported by the SCCER FEEB&D, by the European
Commission project DYMASOS (FP7-ICT 611281), and by the SNSF grant
numbers P1EZP2 172122 and P2EZP2 168812. D. Paccagnan and J. Lygeros
are with the Automatic Control Laboratory, ETH Zu¨rich, Switzerland. Email:
{dariop,lygeros}@control.ee.ethz.ch. F. Parise is with the
Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems, MIT, Cambridge, MA,
USA. Email: parisef@mit.edu.
instantaneous charging, different charging windows, ramping
constraints). Nonetheless, this is a fundamental prerequisite for
the applicability of the aforementioned coordination schemes.1
Following [2], the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium has
been studied in [8], under the assumption of linear price
functions. Both [2] and [8] focus on simplex constraints and
homogeneous populations. The homogeneity assumption is
relaxed in [9], where the authors provide similar efficiency
results of those in [2], but limited to linear price functions
and in a probabilistic sense. Non linear price functions are
considered in [10], but the efficiency results pertain to the
notion of Wardrop equilibrium and charging constraints are
limited to upper bounds. We observe that all the previous
works assume that the price at time t depends only on the
consumption at the same time instant. Finally, we note that
[11] also provides efficiency bounds for charging games, but
the setup considered therein is different, in that each agent’s
decision variable is limited to its starting charging time.
The aim of this paper is to provide efficiency results for
the Nash equilibrium of aggregative charging games under
different assumptions involving finite populations of vehicles,
general convex constraints, non linear price functions and
price dependence on different time instants. To do so, we
model the charging problem as an aggregative game [12], and
study the equilibrium efficiency using the notion of price of
anarchy (PoA). The PoA is a measure introduced in game
theory to quantify how much selfish behavior degrades the
performance of a given system [13]. By definition, PoA ≥ 1
and the closer to 1 the better the overall performance of the
system. The result in [2] can be equivalently stated as the fact
that for homogeneous populations with simplex constraints,
the PoA converges to 1 as the population size grows. Our
main contributions are:
1) We show that the PoA for charging games with linear
price function (that might however depend on all charging
instants) and generic convex constraints always converges
to 1, complementing [2], [8]–[10];
2) For charging games with generic convex constraints and
nonnegative price function that depends only on the instan-
taneous demand, we show that the PoA converges to 1 if
the price function is a positive pure monomial (i.e., αzk for
some α, k > 0). On the contrary, if the price function does
not have this form, it is possible to construct a sequence of
games whose PoA does not converge to 1. In such cases,
we show how results for routing games [14], [15] can be
used to bound the asymptotic value of the price of anarchy.
3) In all the previous cases we provide an explicit bound
connecting the efficiency of the equilibria with the (finite)
1 While there are multiple factors impacting the choice of a control scheme,
if the Nash equilibria do not posses desirable properties, the grid operator has
limited incentive in coordinating the agents to such a strategy profile.
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number of vehicles in the game. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first result providing a bound on PoA
as a function of the population size, for charging games
with general convex constraints and price functions.
Organization: Section II includes the game formulation
and some preliminary notions. In Section III we define the
efficiency metric used throughout this manuscript, and present
the main results for linear and nonlinear price functions.
Section IV focuses on the application of charging a fleet of
electric vehicles. All the proofs are reported in the Appendix.
Notation: Rn≥0 and Rn>0 denote the elements of Rn whose
components are non negative and positive; 0n ∈ Rn (resp. 1n)
is the column vector of zero (resp. unit) entries. Given A ∈
Rn×n not necessarily symmetric, A  0 ⇔ x>Ax > 0, ∀x 6=
0. Given g(x) : Rn → Rm we define the matrix ∇xg(x) ∈
Rn×m component-wise as [∇xg(x)]i,j := ∂gj(x)∂xi . An operator
F : K ⊂ Rn → Rn is called α strongly monotone if (F (x)−
F (y))>(x − y) ≥ α||x − y||2 for some α > 0, ∀x, y ∈ K;
U [a, b] is the uniform distribution on the real interval [a, b].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let us consider a population of M agents, each choosing
an action xi∈X i⊆Rn. Agent i incurs the cost J i(xi, σ(x)) :
Rn ×Rn → R that depends on his own action xi∈X i and on
the average action σ(x) := 1M
∑M
j=1 x
j of the population, as
typical of aggregative games [12]. We assume that
J i(xi, σ(x)) := p(σ(x) + d)>xi , (1)
with d ∈ Rn≥0 and p : Rn → Rn. The cost in (1) can be used
to describe applications where xi denotes the usage level of
a certain commodity, whose per-unit cost p depends on the
average usage level of the other players plus some inflexible
normalized usage level d [2], [6]. We denote with X := X 1×
. . .×XM , and identify such game with the tuple
G := {M, {X i}Mi=1, p}. (2)
A. Nash, Wardrop equilibrium and social optimizer
We consider two notions of equilibrium for the game G.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium [16]). A set of actions xN =
[x1N; . . . ;x
M
N ] ∈ RMn is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if
xN ∈ X and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and all xi ∈ X i
J i(xiN, σ(xN)) ≤ J i
(
xi,
1
M
xi +
1
M
∑
j 6=i
xjN
)
. (3)
Observe that on the right-hand side of (3) the variable xi
appears in both arguments of J i(·, ·). As the population size
grows, the contribution of an agent to the average decreases.
This motivates the definition of Wardrop equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Wardrop equilibrium [17], [18]). A set of actions
xW = [x
1
W; . . . ;x
M
W ] ∈ RMn is a Wardrop equilibrium of G if
xW ∈ X , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and all xi ∈ X i,
J i(xiW, σ(xW)) ≤ J i(xi, σ(xW)) . (4)
Note that in this latter definition the average is fixed to σ(xW)
on both sides of (4). Consequently, a feasible set of actions
is a Wardrop equilibrium if no agent can improve his cost,
assuming that the average action is fixed.
Definition 3 (Social optimizer). A set of actions xS =
[x1S; . . . ;x
M
S ] ∈ RMn is a social optimizer of G if xS ∈ X and
it minimizes the cost JS(σ(x)) := p(σ(x) + d)>(σ(x) + d).
Note that the cost JS is the sum of all the players costs,
divided by M , and the additional term p(σ(x) + d)>d. The
reason why the latter term is included is that we want to
compute the total cost of buying the commodity both for
the flexible (σ(x)) and inflexible (d) users. This cost was
first introduced in [2] and then used in [8]–[10]. The in-
flexible usage level is sometimes modeled in the literature
[9] as an additional player with constraint set represented by
{x ∈ Rn | x = d ·M}, where d is the normalized inflexible
demand. We do not follow such approach here because we
are interested in large populations and this set is unbounded
as M → ∞. Throughout the manuscript, we denote with
Σ :=
{
z ∈ Rn | z= 1M
∑M
j=1 x
j , xj ∈X j , ∀ j = 1, . . . ,M}.
Assumption 1. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the constraint set X i
is closed, convex, non empty. For z ∈ Σ, the function z 7→
p(z+ d) is continuously differentiable and strongly monotone
while z 7→ p(z + d)>(z + d) is strongly convex.
We denote with LS, Lp the Lipschitz constant of JS(·), p(·),
and with α the monotonicity constant of p(·).
III. PRICE OF ANARCHY FOR FINITE AND LARGE
POPULATIONS
In this section we study the efficiency of equilibria as a
function of the population size M . To do so, we consider a
sequence of games (GM )∞M=1 of increasing population size.
For fixed M , the game GM is played amongst M agents and
is defined as in (2) with arbitrary sets {X i}Mi=1. The function
p is instead the same for every game of the sequence.
Assumption 2. There exists a convex, compact set X0 ⊂ Rn
s.t. ∪Mi=1X i ⊆ X0 for each game GM in (GM )∞M=1. Moreover,
J i(xi, σ(x)) is convex in xi ∈ X i for all fixed x−i ∈ X−i,
for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. We let R := maxy∈X0 ||y||.
For a given a game GM , we quantify the efficiency of equi-
librium allocations using the notion of price of anarchy [13]
PoAM :=
maxxN∈NEM JS(σ(xN ))
JS(σ(xS))
,
where NEM ⊆ X is the set of Nash equilibria of GM and xS
is a social optimizer of GM . The price of anarchy captures the
ratio between the cost at the worst Nash equilibrium and the
optimal cost; by definition PoAM ≥ 1. In the next subsections
we study the behavior of PoAM , for three different classes of
admissible price functions p (of increasing generality).
A. Linear price function
Throughout this subsection we consider linear price func-
tions p, as detailed in the following.
Assumption 3. The price function p is linear, that is p(z +
d) = C(z + d), with C = C> ∈ Rn×n, C  0.
Note that Assumption 3 implies strong monotonicity of
z 7→ p(z+ d) and strong convexity of z 7→ p(z+ d)>(z+ d),
therefore Assumption 3 is consistent with Assumption 1. It is
easy to verify that J i(xi, σ(x)) is convex in xi, consistently
with Assumption 2. Nevertheless, C is not required to be
diagonal as it was instead in [8], [9].
Theorem 1 (PoAM bound and convergence to 1).
a) Under Assumption 1 and 3, for any game GM in the
sequence, every Wardrop equilibrium xW is a social
optimizer i.e. JS(σ(xW)) ≤ JS(σ(x)), ∀x ∈ X .
b) With the further Assumption 2, for any fixed game GM in
the sequence it holds that
JS(σ(xS)) ≤ JS(σ(xN)) ≤ JS(σ(xS)) + c/
√
M , (5)
with c = RLS
√
2Lpα−1 constant, xS social optimizer.
Thus, if there exists Jˆ ≥ 0 s.t. JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ for every
game in the sequence (GM )∞M=1, one has
1 ≤ PoAM ≤ 1 + c/
(
Jˆ
√
M
)
and lim
M→∞
PoAM = 1 .
The proof is reported in the Appendix.
Remark 1. The previous theorem extends the results of [2],
[8]–[10] simultaneously allowing for arbitrary convex con-
straints, finite populations, and non diagonal price function.
Note that the condition JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ ≥ 0 is merely technical
and required to properly define PoAM . This condition is
trivially satisfied in the applications when, e.g., every agent
requests an amount of charge bounded away from zero. Even
if the latter condition does not hold, the cost at any Nash
equilibrium converges to the minimum cost as M→∞, see (5).
B. Non linear homogeneous price function
In this section we consider p(z + d) to be a nonlinear
function, and assume its t-th component to depend only on the
t-th component zt + dt, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This models,
e.g., cases where the unit cost of electricity at every instant of
time depends on the total consumption at that same instant.
Assumption 4. The price function p takes the form
p(z + d) =
[
f(z1 + d1), . . . , f(zn + dn)
]>
,
with f(y) : R>0 → R>0. Further X i ⊆ Rn≥0 and d ∈ Rn>0 .
If f(y) is not linear, a simple check shows that, in general,
∇xj (∇xiJ i(xi, σ(x))) 6= ∇xi(∇xjJj(xj , σ(x))) when i 6= j.
Consequently, the game is not potential, [19, Theorem 1.3.1].
Hence methods to bound the PoA based on the existence of
an underlying potential function [8], [9], can not be used here.
Theorem 2 (PoAM convergence and counterexample).
Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Further assume that
JS(σ(xS)) >Jˆ for some Jˆ ≥ 0, for every game in (GM )∞M=1.
a) If f(y) = αyk with α > 0 and k > 0, it holds
1 ≤ PoAM ≤ 1 + c/
(
Jˆ
√
M
)
and lim
M→∞
PoAM = 1 ,
with c = RLS
√
2Lpα−1 constant.
b) For n ≥ 2, if f(y) satisfies the assumptions, but does
not take the form αyk for some α > 0 and k > 0, it is
possible to construct a sequence of games (GM )∞M=1 for
which limM→∞ PoAM > 1.
The proof is reported in the Appendix. Therein, the coun-
terexample relative to b) is constructed using X i = X¯ . In
other words our impossibility result holds also for the case
of homogeneous populations. This is not in contrast with the
result in [2] or [10], because therein the sets X¯ were assumed
to be simplexes with upper bounds constraints. Here we claim
that there exists a convex set X¯ (not a simplex with upper
bounds) such that PoAM does not converge to 1.
Remark 2. The previous theorem is of fundamental impor-
tance from the standpoint of the system operator, in that it
suggests the use of monomial price functions to guarantee
the highest achievable efficiency (all Nash equilibria become
social optimizers for large M ). If different price functions are
chosen, it is always possible to construct a problem instance
such that the worst Nash equilibrium is not a social optimizer.
C. Nonlinear heterogeneous price function
In the previous subsection we showed that if the price
function is not a monomial, then PoAM may not converge to
one. In this section we derive upper bounds for PoAM when
the price function belongs to a general class of functions and
may be different at different time instants, as formalized next.
Assumption 5. The price function p takes the form
p(z + d) =
[
l1(z1 + d1), . . . , ln(zn + dn)
]>
,
where lt(y) : R≥0 → R≥0, lt ∈ L for all t and L is a
given class of continuous and nondecreasing price functions.
Further let X i ⊆ Rn≥0 be non empty, closed and convex.
Note that Assumption 5 is less restrictive than Assumption
4 as we let the price lt depend on the time instant t. The
key idea in this case is to show that standard results derived
in [14], [15] for Wardrop equilibria in routing games can
be applied to charging games too. The resulting bounds on
PoAM can then be derived using the converging result in [18].
More formally, given a charging game GM , we consider an
equivalent nonatomic routing game over a parallel network
with as many links as charging intervals. To present our next
result we introduce the following quantity from [15, Eq 3.8]
β(L) := sup
l∈L
sup
v≥0
(
1
vl(v)
max
w≥0
[(l(v)− l(w))w]
)
.
It follows from [15] that β(L) ≤ 1 and [1−β(L)]−1 = α(L),
where α(L) is the anarchy value for class L as defined in
[14]. Therein (see Table 1), α(L) is computed for classes of
functions such as affine, quadratic, polynomials. The key idea
of the following theorem is to show that the games considered
here are (1, β(L))-smooth, as defined in [20].
Theorem 3 (PoAM for heterogeneous price function).
a) Suppose that Assumption 5 holds. Then for any fixed game
GM and any Wardrop equilibrium xW it holds
JS(σ(xW )) ≤ JS(σ(xS))α(L) (6)
b) Further suppose Assumptions 1, 2 hold, and there exists
Jˆ ≥ 0 s.t. JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ for every game in (GM )∞M=1. Then,
for any game GM in the sequence
JS(σ(xS)) ≤ JS(σ(xN )) ≤ JS(σ(xS))α(L) + c/
√
M,
and 1 ≤ PoAM ≤ α(L) + c/
(
Jˆ
√
M
)
, thus implying
limM→∞ PoAM ≤ α(L), with c = RLs
√
2Lpα−1.
Remark 3. If L contains constant functions, then (6) is
tight (see [14] and the simulation section). This is not a
contradiction of Theorems 1, 2 because therein either constant
functions are not allowed or the price function is assumed to
be time independent. Theorems 1, 2 can be seen as refinements
of Theorem 3 and guarantee that limM→∞ PoAM = 1 by
restricting the admissible class of price functions.
IV. APPLICATION TO CHARGING OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES
We consider a population of M electric vehicles, where the
level of charge of vehicle i at time t is described by sit. Its
evolution is specified by the discrete-time system sit+1 = s
i
t+
bixit , t = 1, . . . , n, where x
i
t is the charging control and b
i > 0
is the charging efficiency. We assume that xit is non-negative,
that it cannot exceed x˜it ≥ 0 at time t and that the absolute
value of the difference between xit and x
i
t+1 is bounded by ri.
The final level of charge is constrained to sin+1 ≥ ηi, where
ηi ≥ 0 is the desired level of charge of agent i. Denoting
xi = [xi1, . . . , x
i
n]
> ∈ Rn, the constraints of agent i reduce to
xi∈X i=
xi∈Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 ≤ xit ≤ x˜it, ∀ t = 1, . . . , n∑n
t=1 x
i
t ≥ θi
|xit+1 − xit| ≤ ri,∀ t = 1, . . . , n−1
 (7)
where θi := (bi)−1(ηi − si1), with si1 ≥ 0 the level of charge
for t = 1. Note that the vehicles are heterogeneous in the total
amount of energy required θi as well as the time-varying upper
bounds x˜it (that can be used to model deadlines, availability
for charging), and the ramping constraints ri. Such constraints
satisfy Assumption 1. Further, we assume that there exists
ηˆ > 0 such that for each M and i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, ηi ≤ ηˆ
so that X0 is compact as required in Assumption 2. Note that
this is without loss of generality in any practical scenario. The
cost function of each vehicle reads as
J i(xi, σ(x))=
∑n
t=1 pt
(
σt(x)+dt
κt
)
xit=p(σ(x)+d)
>xi, (8)
where we assumed that the energy price for each time in-
terval pt : R≥0 → R>0 depends on the ratio between total
consumption and total capacity (σt(x) + dt)/κt, where dt
and σt(x) := 1M
∑M
i=1 x
i
t are the non-EV and EV demand
at time t divided by M and κt is the total production capacity
divided by M as in [2, eq. (6)]. To sum up, we define the
game GEVM as in (2), with X i and J i(xi, σ(x)) as in (7)
and (8) respectively. Let x := [x1; . . . ;xM ] be the vector
of charging schedules for the whole population. The social
cost of the game is JS(σ(x))=
∑n
t=1 pt
(
σt(x)+dt
κt
)
(σt(x) +
dt)=p(σ(x) + d)
>(σ(x) + d), that is, the overall electricity
bill for the sum of non-EV and EV demand; n = 24. For the
numerical study, we consider four cases as described next.
Case 1. We set pt(y) = 0.15y3 and choose x˜it to allow
charging in [timin, t
i
max], with t
i
min, t
i
max uniformly randomly dis-
tributed between 5pm and 10am; θi ∼ U [5, 15], ri ∼ U [1, 7]
and dt as in [2, Figure 1].
Cases 2-4. We set pt(y) = 0.15 from 5pm to 1am and
pt(y) = 0.15y from 2am to 10am. For all vehicles, we choose
x˜it to allow charging from 5pm to 10am. There are no ramping
constraints. Cases 2-4 differ in θi, dt as in the following table.
Case θi dt
2 9 0n
3 9 as in [2, Figure 1]
4 U [5, 13] 0n
For each case, we report the (numerical) price of anarchy as
a function of M in Figure 1 (top). Observe that case 1 and 4
feature heterogenous charging needs. For these cases, we have
randomly extracted 100 games GEVM (for any fixed M ) and
report the worst PoA amongst the 100 realization. In order to
plot the price of anarchy, we computed the ratio between one
(instead of the worst) Nash equilibrium of GEVM and the social
optimum. This choice is imposed by the fact that computing
all Nash equilibria of GEVM is in general a hard problem.2 In
Figure 1 (bottom) we plot the difference between the cost at
the Nash and at the social optimizer, relative to case 1.
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Fig. 1: Price of anarchy (top), and cost difference between
Nash and social optimum (bottom) as a function of M .
Thanks to the choice of parameters and price function,
case 1 meets the Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 (see Lemma
3 in the Appendix). Thus, Theorem 2b) guarantees that
limM→∞ PoAM = 1. The numerical results reported in
Figure 1 (top, black line) are consistent with it: the ratio
between the cost at the Nash and the cost at the social optimum
converges to one. In addition to this, Figure 1 (bottom) shows
that also the difference between these costs converges to zero,
as guaranteed by the proof of theorem 2a) and the boundedness
of X0. A typical plot describing the valley filling property of
the equilibrium in case 1 can be found e.g., in [2, Figure
2]. Case 2 has been constructed so that the corresponding
Wardrop equilibrium features the worst possible asymptotic
price of anarchy within the class of affine cost functions (for
which α(L) = 4/3, see [14]). The numerics of Figure 1 (top,
red line) show that PoAM converges to 1.33 ≈ 4/3 = α(L).
Cases 3 and 4 are a modification of case 2. While the presence
of base demand (case 3) helps in lowering the price of anarchy,
the impact of heterogeneity (case 4) on the asymptotic price
of anarchy is minor (blue and green plots in Figure 1).
2To compute a Nash equilibrium we applied the extragradient algorithm
[19], which is not guaranteed to converge for small M as the operator associ-
ated with the variational inequality of the Nash problem is not guaranteed to
be strongly monotone [18]. We thus verified a posteriori that the point where
the algorithm stopped was a Nash equilibrium.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of charging a fleet of hetero-
geneous electric vehicles as formulated using game theoretic
tools. More precisely, we studied the efficiency of the resulting
equilibrium allocations, measured by the concept of price of
anarchy. We showed that the price of anarchy converges to
one as the population of vehicles grow if the price function is
linear (but possibly dependent on all the time instants), or if the
price function depends only on the instantaneous demand and
is a positive pure monomial. We provided efficiency bounds
for general non linear functions. For these three cases, we also
provided bounds on the PoA as a function of the population
size. Our theoretical findings are corroborated by means of
numerical simulations. We conclude noting that the question
regarding the efficiency of equilibria in aggregative games is of
interest for a broader class of cost functions than those studied
here (e.g., quasi convex costs). We leave this as a future work.
APPENDIX A: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE AVERAGE
This section characterizes the average players’ action σ(x) at
the Wardrop equilibrium and at the social optimizer of G.
Definition 4 (Variational inequality [19]). Given K ⊆ R` and
F : K → R`. A point x¯ ∈ K is a solution of the variational
inequality VI(K, F ) if ∀x ∈ K, F (x¯)>(x− x¯) ≥ 0.
Lemma 1 (Equivalent characterizations).
Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
1) Given xW a Wardrop equilibrium, its average σ(xW) solves
VI(Σ, FW), with FW : Rn → Rn, FW(z) := p(z + d).
The VI(Σ, FW) admits a unique solution σW. Let us define
XW := {x ∈ X s.t. 1M
∑M
j=1 x
j = σW}. Then any vector
of strategies xW ∈ XW is a Wardrop equilibrium.
2) Given xS a social optimizer, its average σ(xS) solves
VI(Σ, FS), with FS : Rn → Rn, FS(z) := p(z + d) +
[∇zp(z + d)](z + d). The VI(Σ, FS) admits a unique
solution σS. Define XS := {x ∈ X s.t. 1M
∑M
j=1 x
j = σS}.
Then any vector of strategies xS ∈ XS is a social optimizer.
Proof: 1) The sets X i are convex and closed by Assump-
tion 1; further, for fixed z ∈ Σ, the functions J i(xi, z) are
linear and thus convex in xi ∈ X i for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. It
follows that (see [18]) a Wardrop equilibrium xW satisfies
[1M ⊗ p(σ(xW) + d)]>(x− xW)≥0, ∀x∈X . (9)
Rearranging and dividing by M we get p(σ(xW) +
d)>( 1M
∑M
j=1 x
i − 1M
∑M
j=1 x
i
W) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ X , or
equivalently p(σ(xW)+d)>(z−σ(xW)) ≥ 0, ∀z ∈ Σ, that is,
σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW). By Assumption 1 FW(z) = p(z+d)
is strongly monotone and Σ is closed, convex (since the
sets X i are closed, convex), hence by [19] VI(Σ, FW) has
a unique solution σW. By definition of variational inequality,
for any z ∈ Σ it holds p(σW + d)>(z − σW) ≥ 0. By
definition of xW ∈ XW, we have σ(xW) = σW. It follows that
p(σ(xW) + d)
>(z− σ(xW)) ≥ 0 for any z ∈ Σ. By definition
of Σ, we conclude that (9) holds for all x ∈ X . Thus, xW is
a Wardrop equilibrium (see [18]).
2) By Assumption 1, the set X is convex and closed and
JS(σ(x)) is convex. Hence, a social optimizer xS satisfies
∇x[p(σ(x)+d)(σ(x)+d)]>|x=xS(x−xS) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ X . (10)
Note that M∇xi(p(σ(x) + d)>(σ(x) + d)) = p(σ(xS) + d) +
[∇zp(σ(xS) + d)](σ(xS) + d) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Conse-
quently, (10) is equivalent to [p(σ(xS) + d) + [∇zp(σ(xS) +
d)](σ(xS) + d)]
>(σ(x) − σ(xS)) ≥ 0 , that is σ(xS) solves
VI(Σ, FS). The remaining claims are proven similarly to 1).
APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF THEOREM 1, 2 AND 3
Proof of Theorem 1
a) Let xW be a Wardrop equilibrium. By Lemma 1 part 1,
σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW). Because of Assumption 3, FS(z) =
C(z + d) + C>(z + d) = 2C(z + d) = 2FW(z). Since the
two operators FW(z) and FS(z) are parallel for each z ∈ Σ, it
follows from the definition of variational inequality that σ(xW)
must solve VI(Σ, FS) too. Using Lemma 1 part 2 we conclude
that xW must be a social optimizer.
b) By definition JS(σ(xS)) ≤ JS(σ(xN)) and so 1 ≤ PoAM .
Further, Assumption 2 and the strong monotonicity of p(z+d)
(Assumption 1) allow us to use the convergence result of
[18, Theorem 1]. That is, for any Nash equilibrium xN and
Wardrop equilibrium xW of the game GM , ||σ(xW)−σ(xN)|| ≤√
2R2Lpα−1M−1. It follows that |JS(σ(xN))−JS(σ(xW))| ≤
LS
√
2R2Lpα−1M−1 = c
√
M−1. Since every Wardrop equi-
librium is socially optimum (previous point of this proof),
one has |JS(σ(xN)) − JS(σ(xS))| ≤ c
√
M−1 and thus
JS(σ(xN)) ≤ JS(σ(xS)) + c
√
M−1. The final result regarding
the price of anarchy follows from the latter inequality upon
dividing both sides by JS(σ(xS)) > Jˆ ≥ 0. 
Proof of Theorem 2
a) We first show that any Wardrop equilibrium is a social
optimizer. To do so, observe that the function f(y) = αyk
satisfies all the assumptions required by Lemma 1 (see Lemma
3 in the Appendix). Let xW be a Wardrop equilibrium of GM .
By Lemma 1, σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FW). Thanks to Assumption
4 and the choice of f(y),
FS(z)=(k+1)[α(z1+d1)
k, . . . , α(zn+dn)
k]>=(k+1)FW(z) .
Hence σ(xW) solves VI(Σ, FS) too. Using Lemma 1 we
conclude that xW must be a social optimizer. The proof is
now identical to the proof of Theorem 1, part b).
b) If f(y) does not take the form αyk for some α > 0 and k >
0, by Lemma 2 there exists a point z¯ ∈ Rn>0 for which FW(z¯)
and FS(z¯) are not aligned, i.e. for which FS(z¯) 6= hFW(z¯) for
all h ∈ R. We intend to construct a sequence of games GM so
that for every GM in the sequence the unique average at the
Wardrop equilibrium is exactly z¯, that is z¯ solves VI(Σ, FW),
but z¯ does not solve VI(Σ, FS). This fact indeed proves, by
Lemma 1, that for any game GM the Wardrop equilibria of GM
are not social minimizers. Since σ(xN)→ σ(xW) as M →∞
[18, Theorem 1], one concludes that PoA cannot converge to 1.
In the following we construct a sequence of games with the
above mentioned properties. To this end let us define X i :=
X¯ ⊆ Rn, so that Σ = X¯ with X¯ := {z¯ + αv1 + βv2 α, β ∈
[0 1]}∩Rn≥0, where v1 := F¯W, v2 := (F¯>W F¯S)F¯W−(F¯>W F¯W)F¯S
and F¯W := FW(z¯), F¯S := FS(z¯); see Figure 2. The intuition is
that −v2 is the component of F¯S that lives in the same plane
as F¯S and F¯W and is orthogonal to F¯W , so that F¯>W v2 = 0.
Observe that Σ = X¯ is the intersection of a bounded
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and convex set with the positive orthant and thus satisfies
Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. It is easy to verify that z¯ ∈ X¯ and that
FW(z¯)
>(z− z¯) = α||FW(z¯)||2 ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Σ = X¯ , so that
z¯ solves VI(Σ, FW). Let us pick zˆ = z¯+βv2. Note that since
z¯ > 0, for β small enough zˆ belongs to Rn>0 as well and thus to
X¯ . Then FS(z¯)>(zˆ− z¯) = β(F¯>S F¯W)2 − β||F¯S||2||F¯W||2 < 0.
The inequality is strict because F¯W, F¯S are neither parallel nor
zero (Lemma 2). Thus, z¯ does not solve VI(Σ, FS). 
Lemma 2. For n ≥ 2, if f(y) satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and
4, but does not take the form αyk for some α > 0 and k > 0,
then there exists z¯ ∈ Rn>0 such that FS(z¯) 6= hFW(z¯), ∀h ∈ R.
Moreover, FS(z¯) 6= 0, FW(z¯) 6= 0.
Proof: Let us consider the first statement. By contra-
diction, assume there exists β(z) : Rn>0 → R such that
FS(z) = β(z)FW(z) for all z ∈ Rn>0. This implies
f ′(zt + dt)(zt + dt) = (β(z1, . . . , zn)− 1)f(zt + dt) , (11)
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all z ∈ Rn>0, d ∈ Rn>0. By
Assumption 4, f(zt + dt) > 0. Hence one can divide (11)
for f(zt + dt) without loss of generality, and conclude that
β(z1, . . . , zn) = β1(z1) = · · · = βn(zn) with βi : R → R
for all z ∈ Rn>0. For n ≥ 2 the last condition implies
β(z1, . . . , zn) = b constant. Equation (11) reads as f ′(y)y =
(b − 1)f(y) ∀y > 0, whose continuously differentiable
solutions are all and only f(y) = ayb−1. Note that if a ≤ 0
or b ≤ 1, Assumption 1 is not satisfied, while if a > 0 and
b > 1 we contradicted the assumption that f(y) did not take
the form αyk for some α > 0 and k > 0. Setting h = 0 in
the previous claim gives FS(z¯) 6= 0. Since f : R>0 → R>0,
one has FW(z¯) := [f(z¯t + dt)]nt=1 6= 0.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the price function p is as in As-
sumption 4 with f(y) = αyk, α > 0, k > 0. Then p satisfies
Assumption 1 and 2.
Proof: Note that ∇zp(z + d) is a diagonal matrix with
entry f ′(zt+dt) in position (t, t). Since f ′(y) = αkyk−1 > 0
for all y > 0 and since zt+dt is positive by assumption for all
t, we get that p(z + d) is continuously differentiable and that
∇zp(z + d)  0 i.e. that z 7→ p(z + d) is strongly monotone.
Similarly, one can show that the Hessian of p(z+ d)>(z+ d)
and the Hessian of J i(xi, σ(x)) with respect to xi are positive
definite. Thus, z 7→ p(z + d)>(z + d) and xi 7→ J i(xi, σ(x))
are strongly convex. See [21] for further details.
Proof of Theorem 3
We prove only a) as b) can be shown as in Theorem 1b). We
define Cσ1(σ2) := p(σ1+d)>(σ2+d) so that JS(σ) = Cσ(σ).
Let xW be any Wardrop equilibrium. Then, the average σ¯ :=
σW solves VI(Σ, FW ) i.e. FW (σ¯)>(σ − σ¯) ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ.
This can be seen following the proof of Lemma 1 part 1),
and observing that only convexity and closedness of X i are
required. Equivalently, JS(σ¯) ≤ C σ¯(σ), ∀σ ∈ Σ. However,
C σ¯(σ) =
∑
t lt(σ¯t+dt)(σt+dt) = JS(σ)+
∑
t[lt(σ¯t+dt)−
lt(σt +dt)](σt +dt) = JS(σ) +
∑
t
[lt(vt)−lt(wt)]wt
lt(vt)vt
lt(vt)vt ≤
JS(σ) +
∑
t β(L)lt(vt)vt = JS(σ) + β(L)JS(σ¯) where we
use vt := σ¯t + dt ≥ dt, wt := σt + dt ≥ dt and dt ≥ 0.
The previous relation holds for all σ ∈ Σ. Selecting σ = σS
(the optimum average), we get JS(σ¯)≤JS(σS)+β(L)JS(σ¯).
Rearranging we obtain (6). 
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